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Changing of
the Guard
By Linus Hoskins
Last October 30th, approximately 80
percent of Jamaica's one million voters
went to the polls and elected a pro-
Western government. Election day was
marked by outbursts of violence, includ-
ing at least three deaths and an alleged
assassination attempt at then-opposition
leader Edward Seaga. It was a landslide
victory for the captialist Jamaica Labor
Party (JLP) over the progressive People's
National Party (PNP). Unofficial results
have indicated that the JLPwon 53.4 per-
cent of the votes, compared to 46.6 per-
cent for the PNP, which means that the
JLP captured 51 of the 60 seats in
Parliament.
The ousted prime minister, Michael
Manley, did, however, win his parliamen-
tary seat. But his finance minister, Hugh
Small, and deputy prime minister of for-
eign affairs, P. J. Patterson, lost their
seats, along with two other cabinet
ministers.
The question that now arises is: What
does this mean for the Third World libera-
tion strugg Ie in general and for the Jamai-
can people in particular?
Inbroad terms, certain peculiarities that
occurred on election day, such as the dis-
appearance of ballots, intimidation of vot-
ers and the stuffing of ballot boxes are
reminiscent of the events that took place
during the 1963elections in Guyanawhen
Marxist Cheddi Jagan was ousted and in
his place conservative Forbes Burnham
elected. (The majority of the Guyanese
people have since lived to regret Burn-
ham's reign and now history's tragedy has
befallen the Jamaican people).
The supporters of the PNP have vowed
that without Michael Manley there would
be violent revolution and retribution.
Edward Seaga, the new prime minister,
has promised public integrity and a mod-
erate government. His first priorities in-
clude the restoration of economic prog-
ress, the expulsion of the Cubans,
including the Cuban ambassador, whom
Seaga has accused as a meddler in local
politics, and establishing close ties with
the United States.
In specific terms, one must begin with
the philosophical premise that in every-
thing bad there is something good. For
the past eight years that the PNPhas been
in office, not enough attention was given
to financial/economic control, planning
and administration. This has had a dra-
matic impact on the living standards of
the Jamaican people. Even then, the ma-
jority of the Jamaican people continued
to support the PNP. However, circum-
stances forced them to substitute their
empty bellies for political reasoning. They
gambled on the JLP, hoping for a better
day.
The defeat of the PNP may spell five
years of capitalist exploitation and the
possible return to the country of the pro-
fessional class who fled the country upon
sensing the tramplings of PNP's Demo-
cratic Socialism. They now stand to reap
economic gains inview of the newJLP ad-
ministration's plan to transform Jamaica
into an exemplary free enterprise state.
Also, the defeat of Manley may have
dealt a very potent moral blow to the
liberation struggle in Southern Africa and
in the Third World. The PNP administra-
tion pursued an activist foreign policy
toward apartheid, racism and imperialism
in Southern Africa. The new Jamaican
government is likely to pursue a passive,
pro-Western foreign policy posture.
Domestic Political Setting
Jamaica's political structure is pat-
terned after the British Westmi.l:istermodel
of government-the two-party system. But
if one were to critically examine this two-
party system one must conclude that the
institutions therein have proven to be in-
adequate for the Jamaican society be-
cause they have not been devised for a
colonized society but are part of the in-
heritance of the colonial era-borrowed
from the imperialist power and imitatively
implanted in the local environment. Ja-
aican political scientist Louis Lindsey
points out:
The adoption of the Westminstermodel
of competitive two-party government fa-
cilitates the persistence of imperalist
control since the model surreptitiously
and erroneously, separates political
power from economic power and pre-
vents economic power holders from the
control of its constitutional provisions.
(Furthermore it lends support) to the il-
lusion that government is government
of the people and for the people. And
ironically, it is this illusion which alien-
ates the (Jamaican) people from their
potential and ossifies colonially gener-
ated myths which keep the society
locked into a status quo of poverty,
multifaceted dependency, and persist-
ent deprivation. 1
Of Jamacia's two political parties, the
P, led by Manley, has been the more
adical or progressive. Since coming to
oower in 1972, the PNP has advocated
state control of the economy, coopera-
- es,greater democratization of the politi-
cal system, a more explicit nationalist
oosture, and social ist ideals geared to
oopularize eglitarianism.
On the contrary, the JLP, led by Seaga,
efends the virtues of the free enterprise
:::apitalist system, opposes the PNP's ad-
..ocacyof sweeping structural changes in
society and the economy but merely
omises better living conditions for the
rking class and the peasantry while
symbolically championing the cause of
socially oppressed under the clarion
I that "deliverance is near."
8y the end of the 1962-72 decade, the
establ ished the institutional infra-
cture to shift the political economy of
- aica from a free enterprise system to
of emergent state capitalism. But
leaders of the progressive populist
ement of the late 1960swho were ab-
-.red into the PNPafter the 1972victory
easingly sought to define the demo-
~ ization issue in terms of expanding the
_ of the state beyond state capital ism
to a state controlled political economy to
serve people's needs more effectively
and to weaken the power base of the
bourgeois interests."
In sum, during the past eight years, the
PNP sought to govern Jamaica in the in-
terest of the masses. The contention that
the PNP is run by Marxists and Com-
munists who have their mind set on turn-
ing Jamaica into a one-party dictatorial
state appears to be nothing more than a
ploy by the JLP and its supporters. In re-
al ity,the PNPis not controlled by Marxists,
although there are a handfuIof Marxists or
Communists in the membership. But they
hardly influence policy.
The PNP Record
Now, let us look at the record of the PNP
since Michael Manley took office in 1972.
The domestic record includes the under-
taking of an unprecedented land reform
program; national control over public
utilities; the creation of sugar workers' co-
operatives; the imposition of the bauxite
levy; the institution of a Minimum Wage
and Labor Relations Act; an end to dis-
crimination against illegitimate children;
compulsory recognition of trade unions;
equal rights for women including equal
pay for equal work and the appointment of
women to senior positions; free education
at the university level; nutrition subsidies
for 70,000 children; rent rollback in de-
pressed areas; national day care pro-
grams; an increase in public assistance;
the establishment of community farms;
special loans to farmers; an attack on
adult illiteracy; the restoration of civil
liberties and an end to harassment of in-
dividuals for political reasons.
Onthe international scene, Jamaica be-
came a Third World force with an inde-
pendent foreign policy and a supporter of
the liberation struggles in SouthernAfrica.
More importantly, the PNP instilled a
sense of national pride and self-worth in
the Jamiacan people. Itmade them aware,
in a historical context, of past exploitation/
oppression and of the necessity to devise
strategies for total liberation.
When one speaks to the average Ja- 21
maican on the streets of Kingston, he or
she not only expounds lucidly on the link-
age between Jamaica's economic plight
and Western imperial ism but is also able
to articulate the positive policies the PNP
has instituted while at the same time not
hesitating to list someof the failures.
Under the JLP government, before PNP .
came to power in 1972,women received
less pay than men; teachers received no
government support; there was no nutri-
tion program; exploitation of tenants and
sugar workers was the ruIe rather than the
exception; master-slave relationships ex-
isted; consolidation of big business exer~
cised political power.
The reign of JLP,from 1962 to 1972,was
characterized by power to the elite, capi-
talism, power for the few, wealth for the
few, opportunity for the few and a bright
future for the few. In fact, during those 10
years, domestic and foreign capitalists
. had such a lucrative time that Jamaica
was labeled the "island of the future" and
"the new Riviera."
Once again, the JLP is in power.
During the election, the JLPdiscounted
all the positive achievements of the PNP
and presented itself as the only alternative
to rescue Jamaica from its political and
economic plight, and promised to restore
intemational confidence in the economy.
JLP supporters were adamant in their
insistence that the PNP is run by what
they call "vulgar Marxists" who have
steered the country into a "silent civil
Cold War" and that Manley is a "political
opportunist" whose primary concern is to
carve a place for himself in the annals of
world history.Understandably, they feared
PNP's democratic socialism and were
prepared to change it at any cost.
Unfortunately for the PNP and its sup-
porters, the machinations of the JLP and
the spurious tactics/accusations of its
followers were successful and sufficient
to stymie the PNP'ssocialistic reformsand
political independence.
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22 Economic Situation
Like other so-called Third World coun-
tries, Jamaica's economic health leaves
much to be desired. While some of the
country's economic ills stem from mis-
management and poor planning (which
the PNP readily admitted) nevertheless
one must consider the openness of the
Jamaican economy, its vulnerability to
fluctuations in the global economy and
the working of the international capitalist
system.
Jamaica falls within the upper middle
income group of developing countries and
has a per capita income of $1,070 (1976).
The country's GNP stood at $2.2 billion in
1976 while the annual population growth
has been 1.7 percent. Unemployment is
posited at31 percent while the public debt
figure is$1.3 billion, in addition to an $800
million oil import bill and a $150 million
food import bill. According to the World
Bank, the Jamaican economy did experi-
ence negative growth during the past few
years.
The unemployment figure is even more
appalling when one realizes that among
young men between the ages of 14and 19
the rate was 50.6 percent as of October
1979; 33 percent for those between 20
and 24 years; and 16.4 percent for those
25 to 34 years. In the case of younger
women, just under 30 percent in the age-
group of 35 to 44 years were unemployed
during the same time; among those 25 to
34 years, the ratewas 42.8 percent; in the
20 to 24 years group, 60.2 percent; and
among the 14 to 19years group a stagger-
ing 82.4 percent.
Needless to say, the PNPadministration
had to devise strategies and programs to
rectify the economic hardships faced by
the Jamaican people in order to win the
election. The majority of the Jamaican
people are suffering economically. In
some instances, bananas are theonly food
hundreds of people live on while others
get meat once every six months. The un-
employment siutation must also be solved
in order to head off social unrest and
disorder.
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Prior to the recent election, the main
concern of the PNPgovemment had been
to "try to provide the facilities through
which the poorest of the land can begin to
walk up the ladder of success" 3 and to
deal with the problem of mismanagement.
In August, Hugh Small, then-minister of
finance, tabled in the Jamaican House of
Representatives a proposal to improve
the system of financial management and
expenditure control that existed in the
public sector. The new financial manage-
ment plan included regular submission
and updating of projected monthly ex-
penditures and intemal monitoring and
reporting systems.
Similar measures were proposed for
expenditure control, with govemment
ministries and departments required to
submit to the Accountant General, for ap-
proval, a daily summary of checks to be
drawn. Penalties were to be instituted for
breach of this instruction. In addition, no
further financial obligations were to be
assumed for new programs and projects.
The instructions also stipulated that all ex-
penditure programs must be reviewed on
quarterly basis. Steps were also taken to
improve the quantity and quality of man-
agement personnel to ensure proper ac-
counting for expenditures and effective
management of resources.'
The hope was that the new measures
would go a long way in allaying some of
the aspects of mismanagement and fi-
nancial maladministration.
Jamaica and the IMF
One of the fallouts of Jamaica's eco-
nomic crisis is the unfortunate fact that
since 1977the Manley administration was
forced into the arms of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for financial bailout.
For many years, Third World countries
have complained about the destabilizing
role,arrogant power and the negative pol i-
cies of the IMF toward the Third World.
Bitter confrontations between Third World
countries and the IMF occur with great
frequency as in the recent cases of Peru,
Tanzania, Chile and Jamaica.
The IMF was established in 1944 by
Westem planners to help countries with
balance of payments difficulties. There
was also the unwritten understanding that
it was to be the "policeman" of interna-
tional capitalism and also serve as the
medium through which the economies of
the Third World would be locked into a
state of dependency on the capitalist
metropolis, ad infinitum.
Inaddition, when a country seeks a loan,
the IMF imposes tough conditions which
include control on imports and foreign ex-
change, devaluation of currency, cut in
govemment spending, especially in the
basic human needs categories of health,
education and welfare; control of bank
credit, higher interest rates and higher
reserve requirements, increase in taxes
and prices charged by public enterprises,
abolition of consumer subsidies, control
of wage increases, dismantling of price
controls and greater hospitality to foreign
investment. The IMF rationale is that in-
vestment by multi-national corporations is
the only means of growth for Third World
countries.
In July 1977, Jamaica and the IMF
worked out a Stand-by Agreement involv-
ing a $75 mi IIion loan. Because of the
country's economy, the IMF "softened" its
usual position and tolerated the dual ex-
change rate system with a basic rate to
cover imports of essential commodities
such as food and oil. Jamaica's liberal
wages policy remained but there had to
be a large reduction in government ex-
penditure ($140mill ion) in return.
The IMF set the follO'Ningquarterly tar-
gets: Net Domestic Assets. Net Interna-
tional Reserves. Net Banking System
Credit to the Public Sector.
InDecember 1977,when Jamaica failed
to meet one of the targets (The Net Do-
mestic Assets of the Bank of Jamaica) by
a margin of $9 million, the IMFsuspended
the Stand-by Agreement. It came up with
a new proposal: that Jamaica should ne-
gotiate a three-year Extended Fund Facil-
ity (EFF) Program and go along with a
further devaluation of its currency. Ja-
maica agreed.
The IMF drew out negotiations of an
Extended Fund Facility for four months
between February and May 1978, whi Ie
the Jamaican economy experienced seri-
ous difficulties because of the lack of for-
eign exchange. The following things
happened:
• Jamaica was unable to pay for imports
of raw materials and supplies of basic,
essential commodities.
• Threats of worker lay-offs intensified.
• Production was disrupted and some
factories were forced to cut back.
• Migration of skilled persons and leak-
ages of foreign exchange to the tune of
$300 million occurred.
InMay 1978,Jamaica agreed to a three-
year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) Pro-
gram with drastic, draconian terms and
conditions. The main elements of the first
year of the program were:
• Unification of the exchange rate plus a
15% currency devaluation of the unified
ratewas set into effect. This meant a 47%
devaluation of the old basic rate applying
to essential imports of basic necessities
plus an additional 15% in monthly install-
ments from May 1978 to May 1979.
• Additional taxes on consumer goods
were instituted.
• Incentives were given to the private
sector by the lifting of price controls and
guaranteed 20% rate of profit. The objec-
tive was to secure more private sector in-
vestment and expansion.
• There was a reduction in the standard
of living of workers by the imposition of a
15% ceiling onwage increases while cur-
rency devaluation and the removal of
price controls generated a 40% increase
in prices.
Jamaica carried out all aspects of the
1978 agreement faithfully, yet the country
continued to experience worsening eco-
nomic conditions.
In May 1979, Jamaica agreed to insti-
tute a "social contract" to limit both wage
increases and price increases to 10%.The
JLP opposition rejected the "social con-
tract." Foreign exchange targets were
fixed forthe elimination of payment arrears
and the accumulation of over $50 million
liquid reserves by December 1979.Fiscal
targets were set to limit bank credit to the
government. The IMF enlarged the lend-
ing program to a total of $248 million from
its supp lementary fac iIity.
Evenwith the IMF'sapproval and having
met all the tests for a year, Jamaica was
unable to secure re-financing of the major
portion of its external commercial debt by
September 1979.Thecountry was also un-
able to secure significant new external
bank loans,because a consortium of com-
mercial banks deferred consideration of a
$650 million re-financing proposal for
Jamacia's external debts.
Jamaica's foreign exchange earning
could not meet the unexpected increase
in payments. As a result, there was a for-
eign exchange gap of$130 million. By De-
cember 1979,the IMFperformance targets
were not met. Analysis shows that 80% of
the foreign exchange shortfall was due to
several major factors outside of Jamaica's
control. The remaining 20%was due to an
error in estimation of the overhang of 1978
imports due for payment in 1979- an esti-
mate in which IMF officials participated.
In terms of the budget, between April
and May 1979, Jamaica fell short of the
program targets by some J$100 million.
This was due to shortfalls in projected re-
ceipts; viz: $40 million in foreign loans,
$40 million on domestic non-bank financ-
ing, $20 million on tax revenue.
Jamaica was led to believe that the IMF
understood the problem and would there-
fore be sympathetic to an application for a
waiver from the December performance
tests. Itwas agreed that Jamaica's exports
had once again become competitive and
that the incomes pol icy was being effec-
tively implemented. The main issues
raised in the discussions with the IMFhad
to do with the size of the government
deficit-the gap between available gov-
ernment revenue and expenditure; the ef-
fectiveness of expenditure controls in
central government; the efficiency of pub-
lic enterprises and the overall efficiency 23
of govemment operations.
These were not areas which gave Ja-
maica problems in principle, since the
government agreed that there were a
number of areas where adjustments and
improvements had to be made. This was
why in December 1979the Jamaican gov-
ernment took action to cut down the num-
ber of ministries from 20 to 13 as the first
step in restructuring the government
machinery. The Jamaica National Invest-
ment Corporation immediately began to
make a careful study of the major public
sector enterprises in order to identify
steps necessary to improve their effi-
ciency and to reduce their operating
losses.
Against this backqround, Jamaica
agreed to several demands of the IMF,al-
though recognizing that many of these ac-
tions could bring increased hardships to
the people. However, it was recognized
that some of the steps were necessary,
with or without the IMF.
There was a breakdown in the negotia-
tions in January 1980.The IMF insisted on
cutting the recurrent budget by an extra
$50 million. This would have meant the
lay-off of some 11,000workers or cutting
several peoples' programs; removal of all
subsidies from food, the Jamaican Omni-
bus Service (JOS) and fertilizers; making
all students at the University of the West
Indies and other educational institutions
pay tuition, and other measures which
would have meant hardships for millions
of people. This was unacceptable to the
Jamaican government.
New negotiations began but by March
22, 1980, it became clear that the IMF re-
quirements were too difficult to meet.
Therefore, it became quite evident that a
continuance of negotiations with the IMF
was no longer feasible. The Jamaican
government reasoned that thewelfare and
interest of the Jamaican people would not
be protected and safeguarded if it entered
into the new IMF agreement. This is the
reasonwhyon March 22, 1980the National
Executive Council of the PNP recom-
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mended to the government that negotia-
tions with the IMF for a Stand-by Agree-
ment be broken off.
Democratic Socialism
Many people suggest that Jamaica's
economic ills are directly correlated to the
PNP's adoption (Nov. 20,1974) of Demo-
cratic Socialism. This pronouncement, the
argument goes, resulted in a massive
frenzied exodus of the professional,
middle-class andwealthy Jamaicans, dis-
investment, high unemployment, and the
24 decline of economic growth. But, to the
end, the Manley administration remained
dedicated tothis policy, which it regarded
as the only remedy to generate economic
justice and self-reliance in Jamaica.
Michael Manley defines his party's
philosophy of Democratic Socialism as:
an economic strategy based on two
things: the belief that the commanding
heights of the economy must be under
public ownership ... and that for the
rest of the economy what we see is a
very dynamic role for the private sector
but a socially reponsible private sector.
A private sector that works within the
overall frame of politically defined na-
tional social objectlvee»
The PNP's socialism acted as a vehicle
for self-assertion against a colonial past
and a mechanism for the creation of a
sense of national pride and international
purpose. Formerministerof foreign affairs,
P.J. Patterson explains:
We commit ourselves to the building of
a democratic society in which people
will bemotivated by the spirit of brother-
hood and sisterhood and understand
they have to build a nation through co-
operation rather than to be inspired
purely by profit and a sense of greed ....
(We) reject the notion that in our situa-
tion we could base the future upon a
system of capitalism which involves the
exploitation of people and obligates in-
dividuals to pursue private gain at the
expense of their fellow citizens without
regard to any other interest.... (We) re-
affirm the belief that it is the sovereign
right of a people, under a democratic
system, to select their own government
without any interference from any other
nation wnetsoever»
It is this last credo that underlies the
fact that the PNP's non-alignment foreign
policy represented a logical extension of
the party's domestic policy of Democratic
Socialism.
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To the PNP,nonalignment meant inde-
pendence of judgment. As Manley stated
unequivocally:
We are the masters in our house and in
our house there shall be no other mas-
ters but us. Above all, we are not for
sete?
This independence of judgement com-
pelled the PNPgovernment to support the
Cuban involvement in the Angolan war of
liberation in 1975, and the call for the in-
dependence of PuertoRico. It has also led
to close ties between Jamaica and Cuba,
the Soviet Union and other Eastern and
Western countries.
Although the PNP administration sup-
ported the U.S. position against the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and the holding
of American hostages in Tehran,Jamaica
did not support the U.S. call for a boycott
of the Moscow Olympics.
TheManley government also conducted
a consistent anti-apartheid policy and did
receive world acclaim for its support of
the liberation movements in Southern
Africa. 0
Linus Hoskins, Ph.D., is professor of political
economy, Washington International University. He
visited Jamaica during the recent elections.
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